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Human supremacy as posthuman risk 
 
Daniel Estrada 





Human supremacy is the widely held view that human interests ought to be privileged 
over other interests as a matter of public policy. Posthumanism is an historical and 
cultural situation characterized by a critical reevaluation of anthropocentrist theory and 
practice. This paper draws on Rosi Braidotti’s critical posthumanism and the critique of 
ideal theory in Charles Mills and Serene Khader to address the use of human 
supremacist rhetoric in AI ethics and policy discussions, particularly in the work of 
Joanna Bryson. This analysis leads to identifying a set of risks posed by human 
supremacist policy in a posthuman context, specifically involving the classification of 
agents by type. 
 




Against the backdrop of numerous political scandals, ethical violations, and calls for 
regulatory oversight in the field of artificial intelligence (Whittaker et al., 2018), the 
rhetorical framework of the “human” has become an increasingly visible shorthand for 
industry and public policy projects to signal a concern for safety, ethical integrity, and 
the responsible use of the AI. Several recent public policy proposals on  AI bear titles 
such as “AI for Humanity” in France1; “HumaneAI”  in the EU2; “AI4People”, Luciano 
Floridi’s recent proposal describing “An Ethical Framework for a Good AI Society” 
(Floridi et al., 2018), and Stanford’s “Institute for Human -Centered AI,”3 whose welcome 
page proudly proposes that “AI is to serve the collective needs of humanity.”  
In these contexts, centering the “human” as the explicit focus of normative 
concern evokes the image of an inclusive framework of shared values and common 
interests to guide the collective use of AI. More subtly, these proposals consistently 
frame AI in the role of a servant to human interests. Unsurprisingly, these proposals 
don’t define the scope or content of the category “human,” how membership in this 
category is to be determined, or what underpins its role as a focal norm in AI policy. And 
yet given that AI is regularly used to target, manipulate, incarcerate, and exploit 
vulnerable populations (witness the use of facial recognition technologies in policing, 
military, and security; election tampering and voter manipulation on social media; 
software that automates criminal sentencing, loan approval, hiring decisions, and so on; 







Buolamwini & Gebru, 2018; Eubanks, 2018; Noble, 2018; Spiel, Keyes, & Barlas, 2019; 
Williams, 2019b) and many others), how can we trust that policies which center the 
“human” will also center us? It is difficult to see how technologies used to expand, 
reinforce, and make more profitable these pervasive institutions of violence and 
oppression could operate against a shared background of values common to all 
humanity. Rosi Braidotti quotes Tony Davies: “All humanisms, until now, have been 
imperial” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 15). From this perspective, the attempt to signal a 
commitment to integrity by appeal to the category “human” reads as more of the empty 
ethics washing that has come to characterize the field (Metzinger, 2019). 
Absent from these human-centered proposals is any engagement with the 
decades of sustained scholarship in feminist, postcolonial, and critical race theory  
(Deckha, 2012; D. Haraway, 1989, 1991; Hayles, 2008; Mills, 2011; E. W. Said, 2004), 
animal rights and environmental ethics (Belcourt, 2015; Gaard, 2011; Katz, 2000; 
Steiner, 2010); STS, HCI, and design theory (Kera, Block, & Link, 2009; Latour, 2003; 
Thomas, Remy, & Bates, 2017; Valentin, 2014), and related fields that have developed 
systematic critiques of anthropocentrism and the politics of the “human.” Among the 
important insights of this diverse literature is the recognition that a superficial appeal to 
inclusive universalism can be used to justify and provide cover for narrowly self -serving, 
exclusive, or imperialist practices (Giraldo, 2016; Khader, 2018). As Charles Mills puts 
the point, “historically and still currently, most humans were not and are not socially 
recognized persons, or, more neatly and epigrammatically put: most persons are non-
persons” (Mills, 2011). Confronting such duplicitous ideologies presents difficult 
conceptual, rhetorical, and practical challenges, suggesting that care should be taken in 
the use of universalizing language (if it is used at all). The uncritical deployment in AI 
policy of human-centered rhetoric as a pretense to ethical integrity speaks not only as a 
tacit endorsement of its imperialist undertones, but more loudly as utter disregard for 
those scholars and activists who have been consistently engaged with the “human” as a 
normative ground. 
This paper seeks to correct these omissions and provoke the AI community to 
adopt a more reflective, informed, and critical perspective on the way human-centered 
rhetoric can function as a cheap proxy for ethical integrity. To these ends we engage 
the work of Joanna Bryson, prominent scholar, public speaker, and policy consultant in 
AI ethics, and author of the unfortunate paper “Robots Should Be Slaves” (Bryson, 
2010). In this and several other essays (Bryson & Kime, 2011; Bryson, Diamantis, & 
Grant, 2017; Bryson, 2018a, 2018b), Bryson and colleagues construct a vision of the 
ethical use of AI that renders these technologies as an explicit social underclass 
modelled after the historical institutions of slavery. This rendering of the “human” as 
categorically dominant over artificial agents in virtue of our kind is the target of this 
analysis of “human supremacy.” Reading Bryson through the wealth of critical 
scholarship on humanism and anthropocentrism, especially as discussed in critical race 
and postcolonial studies, does not merely raise a set of objections to the tone and 
content of her work. It also offers a case study on the relative ease with which 
ideologies of oppression can develop from what might seem like an innocuous 
commitment to an ethic and ontology that puts the “human” first. 
Bryson is by no means alone in her explicit endorsement of  the institutionalized 
slavery of machines (Petersen 2007, 2012). Oscar Wilde anticipates the position as 
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early as 1891: “Human slavery is wrong, insecure, and demoralising. On mechanical 
slavery, on the slavery of the machine, the future of the world depends” (Wilde, 1891). 
Ruha Benjamin presents a striking example of human supremacist rhetoric in an article 
from Mechanix Illustrated from 1965 that predicts “Slavery will be back! We’ll all have 
personal slaves again… Don’t be alarmed. We mean robot ‘slaves’ .” Benjamin notes 
that “It goes without saying that readers, so casually hailed as “we,” are not the 
descendants of those whom Lincoln freed” (Benjamin, 2019, p. 56). This helps locate 
the matrix of oppression, artificial agency, and group identity that we wish to address 
with a critical evaluation of human supremacy in AI. Benjamin continues: “For those of 
us who believe in a more egalitarian notion of power, of collective empowerment without 
domination, how we imagine our relation to robots offers a mirror for thinking through 
and against race as technology” (Benjamin, 2019, p. 56ff). This paper is presented in 
solidarity with those communities who share this commitment to collective 
empowerment.  
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by introducing the term “human 
supremacy” as it appears in the animal advocacy literature, and we engage the 
conceptual and interpretive challenges the term invites in its application to AI ethics. We 
go on to sketch Bryson’s human-centered approach to AI ethics as a paradigm case of 
human supremacy, addressing its theoretical grounding and consequences for policy. 
With Bryson’s views unpacked, we then turn to two resources to understand them: Rosi 
Braidotti’s discussion of reactionary posthumanism in Martha Nussbaum, and the 
critique of ideal theory in Charles Mills and Serene Khader. This scaffolding reveals the 
ideological and institutional foundations for Bryson’s position, and points to an 
alternative approach that emphasizes the nonideal conditions within which subjectivi ty 
and community operate. The paper closes with reflections on the risks of human 
supremacist politics in a posthuman age, specifically concerning the classification of 
agents by type. 
 
 
Human Supremacy in Animal Rights and AI Ethics 
 
Human supremacy is the view that human interests ought to be systematically 
privileged over other interests as a matter of public policy. The term derives from 
activist-scholars in animal rights and environmental ethics (Crist, 2017; Lupinacci, 2015; 
Steiner, 2010) who object to anthropocentric policies that neglect the welfare and 
integrity of nonhuman biological and ecological systems. Similar terms can be found in, 
for instance, Mary Midgley’s “human chauvinism” or “exclusive humanism” (Midgley, 
2003). However, the term “human supremacy” draws on a deliberately provocative 
analogy to white supremacy, that pervasive system of racist structural power and 
oppression which systematically privileges the interests of people identified as “white” 
relative to people who, for various historical and sociopolitical reasons, are not so 
identified. Analogously, human supremacy names those practices which systematically 
privilege the “human” relative to the “nonhuman”. Such ideologies of oppression cannot 
be easily reduced to the prejudiced beliefs or attitudes that some individuals or groups 
hold towards others. The vocabulary of oppression highlights the structural, institutional, 
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and material realities within which some social groups are systematically attacked, 
exploited, and marginalized relative to others. (Frye, 1983; Young, 1988).  
The problematic analogy between white supremacy and the racist oppression of 
humans on one hand and human supremacy and the anthropocentric oppression of 
animals and other nonhumans on the other has been addressed in critical race studies, 
critical animal studies, and ecofeminist literatures (Armstrong, 2002; Gaard, 2011; 
Nocella, 2012; Nocella, White, & Cudworth, 2015; Wise, 2005). These sources 
emphasize that the comparison between oppressed people and industrial livestock is 
deeply insensitive to the history of racialized chattel slavery that operated on this 
analogy4. Critical animal studies scholar Anthony Nocella (2012) argues that members 
of the animal advocacy movement rarely share a common experience of oppression, 
either as a community or with the animals they advocate for. This points to an important 
disanalogy between the (nonhuman) animal rights movement and the ongoing struggles 
against racist, sexist, ableist, and colonialist oppression. A nonhuman animal might 
maul its captor and escape its bonds, but that animal cannot engage directly in political 
resistance without animal activists working on their behalf. The resistance to the 
oppression of humans stands in stark contrast; Nocella quotes political prisoner and 
former member of the Black Panther Party Jalil Muntaqim, “We are our own liberators” 
(Nocella, 2012, p. 148). 
To avoid the “white savior complex” the phrase “animal liberation” implies, 
Nocella suggests thinking instead of “animal justice,” and appreciating how 
interconnected structures of oppression and domination reveals that “fighting for human 
animal rights is fighting for nonhuman animal rights” (Nocella, 2012, p. 150). Similarly, 
Gaard (2011) points to efforts in ecofeminist thought that foreground the intersections of 
race, gender, class, and ecology, for example in, “industrialized  animal  food  
production  and  its  reliance  on  undocumented  immigrant  workers  (who  risk  
deportation  if  they  report  their  hazardous  workplace  conditions)” (Gaard, 2011, p. 
36). Nocella offers several recommendations to integrate the work of animal advocacy 
more deeply with other struggles to end oppression, including centering the work of 
people of color who are engaged in social justice and animal advocacy; challenging 
one’s own whiteness, domination, and elitism5; and resisting the comparison between 
 
4 Reacting to a series of photo campaigns from the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) with titles 
like “Are Animals the New Slaves?” and “Holocaust on your plate”, white anti-racist author Tim Wise explains this 
insensitivity by appeal to the white privilege of many animal rights activists:  
“That PETA can’t understand what it means for a black person to be compared to an animal, given a 
history of having been thought of in exactly those terms, isn’t the least bit shocking. After all, the 
movement is perhaps the whitest of all progressive or radical movements on the planet, for reasons 
owing to the privilege one must possess in order to focus on animal rights as opposed to, say, surviving 
oneself from institutional oppression.” (Wise, 2005)  
5 While I do not identify as white, I am a straight cisgendered able-bodied man with an education and a full-time 
teaching position at a public technical institute, and these advantages put me in a position of privilege relative to 
many oppressed and marginalized people. These advantages have allowed me the opportunity to address the 
social status of artificial agents as a philosophical and scholar-activist project, an opportunity made possible by the 
very same social structures that are systematically targeting Latinx members of my communities in Southern 




forms of oppression “if that comparison is not met with action, and is not examined for 
the purpose of understanding the oppressor” (Nocella, 2012, p. 152).  
Nocella’s advice applies equally to the potentially insensitive comparisons the 
term “human supremacy” invites in the context of artificial agents and AI6. It is critical to 
bear in mind that the that the discourse around the “human” arises in the AI literature at 
the same time as egregious ethical failures in both industry and public policy that 
disproportionately impact the lives of people who have already been marginalized and 
exploited by racism and white supremacy, sexism and patriarchy, transphobia, ableism, 
nationalist xenophobia, and other forms of systemic oppression (Bardzell & Bardzell, 
2015; Irani, Vertesi, Dourish, Philip, & Grinter, 2010; Keyes, Hoy, & Drouhard, 2019). A 
critical inquiry into human supremacy in  AI and the systematic oppression of robots, or 
what might be called critical robot studies, is motivated by an attempt to expose a 
particularly salient form of anthropocentric ideology in mainstream AI ethics, and to 
resist its use to politically justify and institutionalize those oppressive practices. This 
approach does not imply a comparison between the (potential) experiences of artificial 
agents and the multiple intersecting forms of discrimination and oppression faced by 
black and brown people, women and LGBTQIA+ people, and other marginalized groups 
under white supremacy, cisheteronormative patriarchy, and other entrenched systems 
of power. Nocella says, “All suffering is different and is based on individual experience 
even if the oppressive tactic is the same” (Nocella, 2012, p. 147). Our goal is not to 
speak on behalf of or “liberate” robots, nor to merely appropriate the language and 
culture of activist movements. Instead, our goal is to contribute to the struggle against 
all forms of oppression by examining one manifestation of a tactic that impacts the 
operation and public participation of both humans and nonhumans alike; namely, the 
political classification of agents by type, and the systematic privileging of some agential 
types relative to others (Benjamin, 2016; Braun, 2014; Reardon, 2009).  
We adapt the term “human supremacy” from the context of animal and 
environmental advocacy to the field of AI in order to name a nefarious mode of 
classification politics that places the “human” as the locus of systemic privilege. Used in 
this way, the term retains much of its original meaning. Nevertheless, the critique of 
human supremacy in AI presents several unique challenges that distinguish it from the 
animal advocacy case. One important difference is that while anthropocentrism in 
environmental policy can be subtle and may require critical interpretive efforts to 
“recognize” (Lupinacci, 2015), in AI human supremacy is often overt, with the “human” 
presented as the explicit basis for political alliance, as we will see in Bryson’s view in  
the next section. To this extent, the term “human supremacy” functions less as an 
accusation of covert oppressive behavior by analogy to racial oppression, and more as 
an accurate description of an ideological position framed in its proponent’s own terms. 
 
expansion of for-profit concentration camps at the border that have kept innocent people in ter rible conditions 
and have separated thousands of children from their parents. 
6 The term “AI” and “robot” are used to include all technologies addressed under the labels artificial intelligence, 
machine learning, robotics, autonomous vehicles and drones, autonomous weapons systems and surveillance 
equipment, IoT and “smart” appliances, social media bots and other artificial software agents (anthropomorphic or 
not), various expert systems and efficient database management architectures, and nearby technologies. The 
terms for identifying and distinguishing between artificial agents playing various roles remains largely unsettled. 
Occasionally the term “system” or “machine” will be used as inclusive of humans and nonhumans.  
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Before describing Bryson’s view in more detail, we should discuss why human-
centered politics is so broadly welcomed in AI ethics, despite the dismal status of the 
human in the political climate of the Anthropocene (Ellis, 2015; D. J. Haraway, 2016; 
Lewis & Maslin, 2015). The literature discusses two justifications which have, on their 
surface, relatively little to do with each other: the existing international policy framework 
of human rights (Latonero, 2018; Risse, 2018), and the presumed metaphysical non-
agency of artifacts like machines and pieces of software (Boden et al., 2017; Fossa, 
2018). These justifications will be addressed in later sections through the lens of 
Braidotti’s critical posthumanism and Mills’ critique of ideal theory respectively. 
However, one version of the second justification should be addressed before moving 
from the animal ethics literature.  
It is commonly argued that AI is neither biological nor alive, so cannot suffer like 
animals and other living creatures, and therefore cannot participate in a moral 
community in the relevant way to deserve moral consideration . If animal advocacy is 
primarily motivated by animal suffering, and robots cannot suffer, this would seem to 
undermine the possibility that robots could stand in need of the sort of political activism 
seen in the animal advocacy movement. Such arguments are not convincing on several 
grounds. Environmentalists since Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic (1949) have emphasized 
the value of nonliving systems like the soil, water, and air that do not “suffer” in the 
experiential sense of animals with a nervous system, but which nevertheless are vital 
for the integrity of ecological communities, and so might play a focal role in our norms 
and practices (Konopka, 2013). Kate Darling (2016) notes that while the philosophical 
and ethical discussion of animal rights revolves around issues like pain and 
consciousness, “our laws indicate that these concerns are secondary when it comes to 
legal protections” (Darling, 2016, p. 17). Instead, Darling argues that laws tend to follow 
public attitudes towards animals that do not depend on biological differences, as with 
laws in the US that protect horses but not cows from being killed and eaten , despite few 
biological differences that could justify this practice. Several scholars have noted how 
the discourses on conscious experiences in AI privilege a Western European and 
predominantly Christian perspective on artifacts and their relationship to nature and 
society—a perspective that is not universally shared (Gunkel, 2018a; Jones, 2015; 
Williams, 2019). There are also the ongoing discriminatory practices in which the appeal 
to biology is treated as scientific justification for institutional oppression (Appiah, 2018). 
Taken together, these considerations suggest that biological factors should not be 
treated as prima facie justification for the exclusion of artificial agents from the moral 
community.  
Nevertheless, the literature on “robot rights” is overwhelmingly preoccupied with 
whether robots have experiential or conscious states sufficiently “like ours” to warrant 
social status and legal recognition (Danaher, 2019; Gunkel, 2018b; Schwitzgebel & 
Garza, 2015)7. The hypercritical focus on the machine’s experience (or lack thereof) 
 
7 These concerns predate Turing’s (1950) proposed “imitation game,” which can be read as an attempt to redirect 
questions away from the machine’s “experience” and towards the actual conditions of its social performances, 
including our reactions to them (Estrada, 2018; Hayles, 2008). Notice how the systematic comparison between 
human and machine experiences suggested by the popular reading of Turing’s test runs afoul of Nocella’s 




points to another important distinction between animals and AI: artificial agents are 
already visibly engaged in a variety of human sociopolitical contexts, and there is some 
reasonable expectation that their capacities will improve over relatively short time 
scales. To pick a benign example, while it is extremely unlikely that the next 1000 
generations of domesticated cat will develop an affinity for poetry, there are currently 
bots generating poems on Twitter with hundreds of followers (Oliveira, 2017). Such 
systems are already common enough that scholars have begun to discuss the 
aesthetics of AI art (Hertzmann, 2019). The overlap in the sociopolitical circumstances 
of human and artificial agents is not predicated on some shared biological or ecological 
background, nor on shared experiences or conscious states, but more concretely on the 
material and institutional realities within which human and nonhuman agents “share 
existence” (Latour, 2003). Just as the shared material realities of oppression provide a 
framework for collaboration among resistance movements addressing both human and 
nonhuman animal interests—despite important differences in the history and 
experiences motivating this work—this very same framework of resistance provides 
resources to critique and resist biocentrism and anthropocentrism in the discourse 
around AI and artificial agency, despite a strong tradition emphasizing the differences 
between biological and artificial agents.   
The possibility for radical near-term change in the agential capacities of AI 
suggests its sociopolitical status will likewise remain unsettled. Asaro (2006) notes, “At 
some point in the future, robots might simply demand their rights” (Asaro, 2006, p. 12). 
However, such a future would require not just a change in the capacities of artificial 
agents, but also an ethical and interpretive change in society’s capacities to recognize 
and respect such demands as legitimate political acts. The demand for cultural changes 
in our attitudes towards artificial agents echoes Turing’s plea of “fair play for machines” 
(Estrada, 2018a; Turing, 1947). If the kind of critical self-reflection required to advocate 
on behalf of machines was available to Turing, surely it is available to us as well.  
 
 
Human supremacy in Bryson’s ethics 
 
Joanna Bryson is a Reader and Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Computer 
Science at the University of Bath . Outside her work in AI ethics, Bryson’s research 
focuses on computer models of economic and cooperative behaviors, with strong 
influences from cognitive and evolutionary psychology. Although this research 
somewhat overlaps with her work in AI ethics (Bryson, 2015a), it is beyond the scope of 
this paper to address Bryson’s full research project. Instead, the goal of this section is to 
present a critical reading of the article “Robots Should Be Slaves” (RSBS) (Bryson, 
2010) and other papers that shed light on its motivation, perspective, and influence on 
Bryson’s efforts as a high level policy consultant in AI. Despite its theoretical problems, 
Bryson’s work has the virtue of clarity and precision (sometimes unwittingly) in the 
articulation of her views, and so serves as a model case for studying human 
supremacist ideology in AI.  
 
recognize that it creates social circumstances that are especially hostile to the possibility of recognizing and 
respecting artificial agents (Hayes & Ford, 1995). 
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Written nearly a decade before RSBS, Bryson’s earliest contribution to AI ethics 
scholarship is the coauthored conference paper, “Just Another Artifact: Ethics and the 
Empirical Experience of AI” (Bryson & Kime, 1998) which lays out many of the elements 
of her considered view. Bryson & Kime’s explicit motivation in this paper is to address 
certain “exaggerated fears” (p. 1) from Vernor Vinge and other early proponents of the 
Singularity hypothesis: that computers might surpass human intelligence and take over 
the world (Vinge, 1993). Bryson & Kime argue that these misplaced fears come from an 
“over-identification with machines,” a mistake that is “symptomatic of a larger problem—
a general confusion about the nature of humanity and the role of ethics in society.” (p. 1) 
What is the nature of humanity and the role of ethics in society? The authors claim that 
“ethics has evolved as a mechanism of human social cohesion, without which society 
disintegrates” (p. 2). The primary mechanism driving social cohesion is empathy: “we 
care for people or objects that we would feel badly for if they were hurt or damaged” 
(ibid, original emphasis). This feeling of empathy in turn creates a sense of identification 
with those we empathize with. The relative strength of this identification generates an 
individual’s hierarchy of ethical obligation, “with ourselves and our families tending to be 
at the top, followed by our neighbours and other people with whom we acknowledge 
commonality” (ibid). Bryson & Kime argue that this general picture suggests that, “self-
interest is the root of our ethics” (p. 4).  
In the case of the Singularity theorists, Bryson & Kime argue that the mechanism 
of social identification has been misapplied to machines. They explain this confusion by 
appeal to our tendency to distinguish ourselves from animals—itself grounded in the 
evolutionary drive to empathetic social cohesion. They claim, “To form a human society, 
one needs to value the lives of humans in the community over the lives of other 
animals” (ibid). They argue that over-identification with machines “lead[s] to an 
undervaluing of the emotional and aesthetic in our society. Consequences include an 
unhealthy neglect and denial of emotional experiences” (ibid). They identify two specific 
dangers of over-identification, that, “we may believe the machine to be a participant in 
our society, which might seriously confuse our understanding of them,” and “we may 
overvalue the machine when making our own ethical judgments and balancing our own 
obligations” (ibid). They dismiss any view that values AI, “to the exclusion of our own 
existence” as “nihilism” (p. 6). The most substantial citation offered for these claims is 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
To be clear, there are many reasons for finding these views unsatisfying as an 
ethical framework. The direct line drawn between evolutionary psychology and ethical 
obligation is theoretically implausible (Street, 2006). The relationship proposed between 
empathy and social identification is, at best, oversimplified (Jenkins, 2014). The view 
that AI is only dangerous through its misuse or abuse by humans is known in the 
philosophy of technology literature as “technological neutrality” or “instrumentalism,” 
(Kaplan, 2009), a problematic view as a policy position in tech development (Koops, 
2006; Reed, 2007; Winner, 1980). Attributing to her opponents’ “unhealthy” 
psychological disorders is a questionable rhetorical tactic that was rightly edited out of 
the 2011 version. However, it is not our goal to present a scholarly critique of a 
conference paper from more than twenty years ago. Instead, our goal is to trace the 
development of a view that results in the explicit endorsement of slavery as a political 
framework for managing robots. For our purposes, the most relevant features of 
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Bryson’s position in this paper are the claims that identification drives moral obligations, 
and that identifying with AI is a mistake.  
Neither claim is compelling. On purely psychological grounds, social identification 
is unlikely to build models that are consistent enough to serve as a basis for moral 
reasoning. Jenkins (2014) introduces the psychology of social identity by explaining,  
 
“… our classificatory models of self and others are multidimensional, unlikely to 
be internally consistent, and may not easily map onto each other. Hierarchies of 
collective identification may conflict with hierarchies of individual identification, 
which means that the following might make complete interactional sense: I hate 
all As; you are an A; but you are my friend. Taken together, these points suggest 
that categorical imperatives are unlikely to be a sufficient guide on their own , and 
that the ability to discriminate between others in subtle and fine-grained ways is 
an everyday necessity.” (Jenkins, 2014, p. 6) 
 
Bryson’s later work emphasizes that moral systems should be “coherent” (Bryson, 
2018b, p. 202) If identification does not produce consistent moral frameworks, it seems 
highly unlikely that “over-identification” (with machines or anything else) is a serious 
threat to the social order. Suggesting that AI policy should center on cultivating the 
appropriate social identification practices seems impractical, to say nothing of its ethics.  
For the sake of argument, however, suppose we accept Bryson’s first claim. If 
identification is the root of obligation, then the psychological fact that we identify with 
machines would suggest some obligations to those machines. What justifies the claim 
that such identification is inappropriate or mistaken? Bryson & Kime (1998) recognize 
that ethical systems can be “somewhat arbitrary,” and that in novel circumstances (as 
with AI), we are “to some extent free to create a new ethical standard” (p. 5). So why not 
take our identification with machines as evidence of a new set of moral obligations? The 
authors defend their judgment with two responses, one they describe as “technical”, the 
other “ethical” (p. 3). Their technical response recognizes that people tend to ascribe 
capabilities to machines that those machines don’t have. Their ethical response 
recognizes that some people might already believe that some computer programs are 
more valuable than a human life, but that we face a similar challenge with other artifacts 
like “fine art and political institutions” (p. 3).   
Neither response addresses this issue at stake, which is how we decide which 
forms of identification (and which identities) are appropriate or inappropriate. As to the 
technical response: we identify not just with other people, but with sports teams and 
brand names and superheroes and all manner of things. The fact that we make errors 
about the capacities of these entities says very little about whether our identification with 
them is appropriate or inappropriate. When fans of an underperforming sports team are 
unrealistically optimistic about their performance in tonight’s game, this is not evidence 
that their identification with the team is mistaken, inappropriate, or symptomatic of 
deeper psychological or conceptual problems. The ethics of identification are not settled 
by the accuracy of the predictions it generates.  
This technical response is particularly confusing given that their proposal 
contains much better resources for addressing the concern: specifically, the 
evolutionary drive to “social cohesion.” On this supposedly ethics-grounding biological 
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imperative, the precise nature of the ethical system doesn’t matter so much as its 
overall impact on social stability and (ultimately) the reproductive success of the 
species. This would seem to make the issue an open empirical question: does 
empathizing with machines make for a more stable social order? Or perhaps better as 
an engineering and design question: how do we design more stable social systems 
through the natural empathy people have towards machines? By insisting that the 
identification with machines is a conceptual mistake, Bryson & Kime cut off these 
possibilities and effectively limit the ethical discourse to controlling the frequency and 
impact of these “anthropomorphic fallacies” (p. 7). In this spirit they claim, “The issue of 
forming identity is now more than ever an issue for public education,” suggesting the 
need for institutionalized policies that control how social identities are formed and who 
we identify with.  
Bryson & Kime’s second “ethical” response reveals an important assumption in 
Bryson’s ethical perspective: that the evolutionary dynamics of obligation are zero sum, 
and that developing new obligations towards AI would entail fewer obligations to 
humans, animals, and society generally. The risk is not simply that we identify with AI, 
but that we identify with AI at the expense of identifying with humans; if obligation is 
zero sum, these identities are necessarily in competition. Since they assume that 
obligations to other humans is vital for social cohesion , then over-identification with AI is 
not merely inappropriate; it presents a clear threat to the social order. They recognize 
that this threat is not unique to AI, and point to the resources used to maintain the Mona 
Lisa that could be used instead for people in need. Restating this argument, Bryson & 
Kime are claiming that great art threatens social cohesion (and our evolutionary 
success!) by potentially generating more empathy for art than we have for other people. 
Their criticism of AI is that it might pose the same threat to social cohesion as posed by 
great art. One might have thought that art provides a clear example in which 
identification and obligation are not zero-sum, where we might be a more stable, 
cohesive, empathetic society because of the resources we invest in public art. But for 
Bryson & Kime, producing great art is a social liability, a risk we accept, like car 
accidents, because of the pleasure and convenience those artifacts bring us.   
Despite their weaknesses, these positions have a strong influence on Bryson’s 
later work. RSBS is published as a book chapter in 2010 after being solicited for a 
conference on “Artificial Companions in Society” at Oxford in 2007. Its publication 
coincides with a burst of papers and conference presentations with titles like “Building 
Persons is a Choice” (Bryson, 2009); “Why robot nannies probably won’t do much 
psychological damage” (Bryson, 2010b); and “AI/Robots should not be considered 
moral agents” (Bryson, 2011). These papers all expand on the themes developed in 
“Just Another Artifact,” highlighting the ethical challenge of over-identification with AI 
and the conceptual mistakes and dangers it invites. Clearly, Bryson’s immediate goal in 
this collection of work is not to subjugate robots, but to correct what she sees as the 
conceptual confusion generated by an inappropriate identification with machines. In 
2010, Bryson participated in a retreat that produced a set of “Principles of Robotics” 
(Boden et al., 2017) that reinforces these themes. Of the five rules laid out in the 
document, the first four simply state what robots are: “1: Robots are multi-use tools…, 2: 
Humans, not robots, are responsible agents…, 3: Robots are products…, 4: Robots are 
manufactured artifacts…” (Boden et al., 2017, p. 125ff). As a policy proposal, the 
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document recommends the development of industrial identification practices that clearly 
distinguish between the capacities of robots and humans. These principles give the 
myopic impression that the primary ethical risk presented by AI is a metaphysical and 
ontological confusion over their agential status.  
The theoretical grounding for RSBS is now brought into focus. By asserting 
“robots should be slaves” (Bryson, 2010a), Bryson takes for granted not only that 
humans should not be treated as slaves, but also that no one would identify or 
empathize with slaves. Calling robots slaves draws attention to this strong categorical 
distinction between humans and robots, and challenges the excessive empathy with AI 
that she takes to be the central risk at stake. In RSBS, Bryson repeats the claim of that 
“our identity confusion results in somewhat arbitrary assignments of empathy” (p. 4) and 
lists a set of costs for both individuals and institutions associated with the over-
identification with AI (p. 5). She calls “being too generous with personhood” a “moral 
hazard” (p. 7). She rehearses the zero-sum reasoning8, arguing that “humans have only 
a finite amount of time and attention for forming social relationships” (p. 5). While 
Bryson recognizes that the costs of identification “could be negative,” she doesn’t spend 
much time discussing the social benefits of identifying with machines, or how to design 
machines that maximize these benefits.  
Instead, she uses her list of perceived costs to motivate what she calls the 
“correct metaphor” for robotics: that “robots should be servants you own” (p. 3). She 
says, “communicating the model of robot-as-slave is the best way both to get full utility 
from these devices and to avoid the moral hazards” (p. 8). RSBS lists “the fundamental 
claims of the paper” as: 
 
 “1. Having servants is good and useful, provided no one is dehumanized.” 
2. A robot can be a servant without being a person. 
3. It is right and natural for people to own robots. 
4. It would be wrong to let people think that robots are persons.” (p. 3) 
 
As the list suggests, Bryson’s concern for dehumanization is mostly an afterthought. 
She says, “Surely dehumanization is only wrong when it’s applied to someone who 
really is human?” (p. 2) Bryson goes on to briefly discuss the history of domestic labor in 
British villages from 1574-1821 in a positive light, claiming that roughly 30% of 
households employed servants. She justifies this practice by appeal to the inadequacies 
of an unpaid gendered division of labor, saying, “Where wives and other kin were not 
available to devote their full time to these tasks, outside employees were essential” (p. 
8)9. Bryson reflects favorably on the current market for domestic labor, but argues “the 
most difficult thing with human servants is of course the fact that they really are 
humans, with their own goals, desires, interests, and expectations which they deserve 
to be able to pursue” (p. 9).  
 
8 In (Bryson et al 2017), Bryson et al recognize the potential problem with this zero-sum reasoning, but they appeal 
to it anyway, saying “While not always a zero-sum game, sometimes extending the class of legal persons can come 
at the expense of the interests of those already within it. In the past, creating new legal persons has sometimes 
lead to asymmetries and corruptions such as entities that are accountable but unfunded, or fully -financed but 
unaccountable.” 
9 If  they were essential, what did the other 70% do? 
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On the other hand, because robots “are wholly owned and designed by us” (p. 9), 
they cannot be frustrated, exploited, or made to suffer unless we deliberately design 
them with these capacities. So long as we aren’t anthropomorphizing robots in ways 
that causes confusion or excessive empathy, she says “owners should not have ethical 
obligations to robots… beyond those that society defines as common sense and 
decency, and would apply to any artifact” (p. 10). Bryson admits we have ethical 
obligations concerning robots, about their safe operation and so on, but we have no 
obligations to the robots themselves; destroying a robot is ethically equivalent to the 
destruction of any property. In one of the more frustrating passages (p. 8), Bryson 
suggests that people who aren’t comfortable with the metaphor of slavery might instead 
adopt the perspective of extended mind theory (Clark & Chalmers, 1998), where our 
tools are understood as extensions of our own capacities. Bryson doesn’t consider that 
the extended mind theory encourages us to strongly identify with our machines (Ahuvia, 
2005), or why this might be inconsistent with her proposal for robots-as-slaves.  
Obviously, the appeal to the institution of slavery as “good and useful, … right 
and natural” is profoundly insensitive and simply in poor taste. It also highlights the deep 
theoretical failure in Bryson’s ethics. Just as with the Mechanix Illustrated comic from 
1965, Bryson takes for granted that the public would identify with slave owners rather 
than slaves, and with the 30% of the British who hired domestic servants, rather than 
the 70% from whom they were hired. These assumptions speak volumes on Bryson’s 
perception of her own social status and ethical obligations. More importantly, they speak 
to the substantial challenges involved in grounding ethical policy in social identity 
construction, challenges Bryson clearly did not anticipate when writing this essay. 
Although the essay makes token gestures to recognize the cruelty of the historical 
institution of racialized slavery, she takes no effort to consider how the metaphor of 
slavery might be interpreted by those who don’t immediately identify—that is, 
empathize—with slaveholders over slaves, or the moral hazards involved with giving 
any defense of slavery as a political institution. Fundamentally, Bryson does not think 
the problem with slavery was the ideology of domination and oppression it represents; 
the problem with slavery was that we were enslaving the wrong things! Thankfully, 
experts like Bryson are here to make sure we’re practicing slavery correctly.  
RSBS has received substantial scholarly attention in the AI ethics literature 
(Agar, 2019; Coeckelbergh, 2015; Frank & Nyholm, 2017; Gunkel, 2015, 2018b; Musiał, 
2017; Neely, 2014; Prescott, 2017; Rainey, 2016; van Wynsberghe & Robbins, 2019). 
While much of this literature is critical of Bryson’s hasty and insensitive language, few 
engage Bryson ’s theoretical approach from the perspective of standpoint epistemology 
or critical race theory. As a consequence, the primary lesson Bryson has drawn from 
this criticism is that “you cannot use the term ‘slave’ without invoking its human history” 
(Bryson, 2015b). In other words, she thinks criticisms are reacting to her choice of 
language, not to the oppressive ideology that language articulates, or the casual neglect 
it shows for those who don’t share her identities or perspective.  
So, despite these scholarly criticisms, Bryson ’s work continues to develop the 
central perspective in RSBS. In “Of, for, and by the people: the legal lacuna of synthetic 
persons” (Bryson et al., 2017), Bryson claims that “the basic purposes of human legal 
systems” include a principle that, “Should equally weighty moral rights of two types of 
entity conflict, legal systems should give preference to the moral rights held by human 
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beings.” (Bryson et al., 2017, p. 283) Notice the tacit assumption that part of the basic 
purpose of human legal systems is to sort entities by type. Lest there remains any 
ambiguity in Bryson’s intentions, she describes her position as, “an uncontroversially 
light thumb on the scale in favor of human interests. Yes, this is speciesism” (ibid). In 
“Patiency is not a virtue: the design of intelligent systems and systems of ethics”, 
Bryson argues that making robots deserving to be moral patients “could in itself be 
construed as an immoral act” (Bryson, 2018b, p. 16). In “No One Should Trust AI” 
(Bryson, 2018a), Bryson argues that trust is a relationship between peers, and since we 
aren’t peers with AI, “no one actually can trust AI” (emphasis original). In these papers, 
one of Bryson’s explicit concerns is that malicious corporate actors might 
anthropomorphize machines in order to exploit our psychological biases and legal 
loopholes. While the language of slavery is absent from these essays, her solutions 
nevertheless involve policy that imposes a strict hierarchy in which machines are 
categorically subordinate to human interests. Since humans and machines are not 
distinguished by species, describing this view as “speciesism” is inaccurate. Bryson 
defense of policy that establishes an explicit social hierarchy modelled on slavery that 
classifying and systematically privileges humans deserves the name human supremacy.  
Dismissing these views as eccentric or theoretically untethered ignores the rise 
to prominence as a speaker, consultant, and high-level policy expert that Bryson has 
enjoyed in AI ethics on the strength of this work. In 2017, Bryson was quoted calling the 
popular humanoid robot Sophia’s award of Saudi citizenship “bullshit” (Vincent, 2017). 
The comment earned her a public debate with Sophia creator David Han son at CogX 
2018 (Estrada, 2018b). In 2019, Bryson was selected to sit on the controversial 
Advanced Technology External Advisory Council at Google (Johnson, 2019), a body 
she continued to defend after activist protest shut the program down (Bryson, 2019). To 
some extent, Bryson was in the right place when the AI boom hit to find success in the 
developing field of AI ethics. At the same time, her success can be at least partly 
attributed to an industry and regulatory climate that was particularly receptive to the 
vision of human-centered ethics her work developed. To address the broader milieu in 
which Bryson’s work finds success, we turn next to the work of Rosi Braidotti and 
Charles Mills.  
 
 
Reactionary posthumanism and ideal theory 
 
If, as Bryson suggests, humanity is in the grips of an identity crisis, then Braidotti’s 
framework of “the posthuman” (Braidotti, 2013) may help diagnose the problem. For 
Braidotti, posthumanism marks an historical condition characterized not only by a “crisis 
of Humanism,” but also the active exploration of “alternative ways of conceptualizing the 
human subject” (p. 37). Braidotti identifies three strands of posthuman thought that trace 
out different responses to our posthuman condition: one, a critical posthumanism 
informed by anti-humanist philosophies of subjectivity from Braidotti’s own scholarly 
tradition (Braidotti, 1994, 2002; Foucault, 1977); second, an analytic posthumanism that 
derives from explorations of the human in science and technology studies (Roden, 
2014; Verbeek, 2005, 2011); and finally, a reactionary posthumanism for whom “the 
posthuman condition can be solved by restoring a humanist vision of the subject” 
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(Braidotti, 2013, p. 39). Braidotti’s discussion of reactionary posthumanism is most 
relevant for our treatment of Bryson’s views.  
Braidotti associates reactionary posthumanism with Martha Nussbaum (1998, 
2010) who, Braidotti argues, “defends the need for universal humanistic values as a 
remedy for the fragmentation and relativistic drift of our times” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 39). 
For Nussbaum, this fragmentation is produced by the socioeconomic condition of 
globalization, which threatens humanity through the reactionary “plagues” (ibid) of 
ethnocentrism and xenophobic nationalism. According to Braidotti, Nussbaum believes 
that the solution to these threats is a cosmopolitan universalism informed by classical 
humanist ideals. Braidotti says that for Nussbaum, “abstract universalism is the only 
stance that is capable of providing solid foundations for moral values such as 
compassion and respect for others” (ibid). Nussbaum acknowledges the problematic 
historical use of humanist ideals as a discriminatory or exclusive practice, and she 
responds to these past failures with a call for a neo-humanism that centers the 
subjectivity of experience. While Braidotti praises this move, she argues that 
Nussbaum, “reattaches [subjectivity] to a universalistic belief in individualism, fixed 
identities, steady locations and moral ties that bind” (ibid). Because of this 
“disembedded universalism, Nussbaum ends up being paradoxically parochial in her 
vision of what counts as the human… leaving no room for experimenting with new 
models of the self” (ibid).  
For example, Braidotti describes Nussbaum’s defense of a liberal education  
(Nussbaum, 2010) as “elitist and nostalgic” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 173), noting that by the 
time of its publication, the university had already been refigured in the market economy 
as a corporate structure (p. 150). Braidotti’s point is not simply to disagree with 
Nussbaum about the value of a liberal education, but rather to recognize that the liberal 
ideals which ground Nussbaum’s defense are out of touch with the material and 
institutional realities which benefit from that defense. If universities are managed like 
for-profit corporate chains, this muddies the narrative of the liberal ideal that the 
university supposedly represents. Similarly, if the rhetoric of universalist humanism is 
used to protect narrow and exclusive practices, it undermines the appeal of those 
humanist ideals. The point is not that the humanist ideals—for instance, the framework 
of human rights in international justice—are necessarily bad as a statement of absolute 
morality, but rather that the ideals are easily used to defend the very practices that 
subvert them. Similarly, when humanist ideals are used to justify an exclusive attitude 
towards artificial agency its apparently inclusive framing is undermined.  
Charles Mills’ (2005) critique of “ideal theory” as ideology provides conceptual 
tools for thinking through this potentially confusing discursive situation. For Mills, “ideal 
theory” describes not just the appeal to idealizations, which to some extent cannot be 
helped in theoretical discourse. Rather, ideal theory describes “the reliance on 
idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual” (p. 168). For 
instance, ideal theory might concern itself with how an ideal society would structure its 
basic institutions, rather than addressing the social circumstances in which its actual 
institutions operate. Mills claims that ideal theory will typically employ assumptions that 
idealize human capacities, social institutions, and social ontology in ways that “abstract 
away from relations of structural domination, exploitation, coercion, and oppression, 
which in reality, of course, will profoundly shape the ontology of those same individuals” 
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(p. 168). Mills says, “It is obvious that ideal theory can only serve the interests of the 
privileged who, in addition—precisely because of that privilege (as bourgeois white 
males)—have an experience that comes closest to that ideal, and so experience the 
least cognitive dissonance between it and reality” (p. 172). 
Restating the critique of Nussbaum in Mills’ terms, Braidotti is accusing 
Nussbaum of embracing universalist humanism as an idealization to the exclusion of 
the actual. It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess whether Braidotti’s criticisms 
are fair to Nussbaum’s actual views. What matters for our purposes is Braidotti’s 
analysis of how a reactionary embrace of humanist ideals in a posthuman context can 
suffer from the ideology of ideal theory. The institutional realities of the corporate 
influence on the university system have real implications for our discussion of the value 
of higher education, and this influence can’t be dismissed or marginalized by appeal to 
classical humanist ideals. Mills explains that by, “abstracting away from realities crucial 
to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and 
social institutions” (p. 170), the appeal to ideal theory effectively guarantees that those 
ideals will never be achieved.  
Together, Braidotti and Mills help articulate the critical failures in Bryson’s ethics 
beyond the mere insensitivity of her language. Like Nussbaum, Bryson respon ds to the 
crisis of humanism by asserting nostalgic, elitist idealizations of social institutions and 
social ontology, such as “servants are useful and good,” or “no one should trust AI.” 
Bryson presents herself as speaking on behalf of humanity’s interest, when in fact her 
proposal showcases a narrow and privileged perspective that inadvertently alienates 
those who don’t already share it. In so doing, Bryson neglects the structures of power 
and domination within which humans and nonhumans share existence.  
 
 
Human supremacy as posthuman risk 
 
Consider, for instance, the startup Kiwibots, which offers a food delivery service using 
small robots in the Bay area. Kiwibots set itself apart from similar services in deciding 
against using AI software to control their bots. Instead, as reported in the Chronicle (C. 
Said, 2019), they farm out the control task out to operators in Colombia who use GPS to 
direct the bot to its destination. The Colombian operators are paid less than $2 an hour, 
which the Chronicle says is more than the local minimum wage. Kiwibots provides an 
interesting case at the intersection of automation, teleoperation, and the global labor 
market. It also provides a confounding case for idealizing proposals like Bryson’s that 
insist on a strict dichotomy between humans and machines. Social policy treating this 
robot as a slave would be indirectly treating another human as a slave, with many of the 
same structures of exploitation and oppression the term invites. Though Bryson 
explicitly rejects forms of servitude that lead to dehumanizing people, in this case we 
can’t easily distinguish between the human and the robot, so we can’t tell if our 
dehumanizing behavior is “appropriate” or not.  
Such cases are by not unique. The New York Times reported in May that 
Google’s automated assistant Duplex transfers around 25% of calls to a human 
operator (Chen & Metz, 2019). After Duplex’s controversial debut, there have been 
several proposals for laws that would require such automated services to identify 
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themselves as bots. These “bot disclosure” laws have faced objections from civil rights 
groups like the EFF, who worry that an “across the board bot-labeling mandate would 
sweep up all bots,” including those being used for protected speech (EFF, 2018). The 
relative difficulty in distinguishing between human and machine behavior already means 
that solving CAPTCHAs (Von Ahn, Blum, Hopper, & Langford, 2003) is part of the daily 
life of a digital citizen. It’s worth recognizing that CAPTCHAs were originally developed 
not only to filter out bots, but also as a source of free labor to crowdsource difficult 
problems in early machine learning (Lung, 2012). This highlights the deep connections 
between bot identification, the exploitation of labor, and the industry’s penchant for the 
systematic classification of agents by type (Stieglitz, Brachten, Ross, & Jung, 2017; 
Suárez-Serrato, Velázquez Richards, & Yazdani, 2018).  
What’s the alternative to the ideal theory of reactionary posthumanism? 
Following Mills, Serene Khader advocates for a nonideal universalism that emphasizes 
the nonideal, unjust conditions of political action (Khader, 2018). Khader says, “One 
defect of ideal theories… is their tendency to redirect our evaluative gazes to the wrong 
normative phenomena” (p. 36). By redirecting that gaze towards the actual conditions of 
injustice, Khader argues that we will be in a better position to address those injustices. 
While Khader’s nonideal universalism is developed in the context of transnational  
feminism, we might adapt the approach to an AI ethics context by recognizing the 
nonideal and unjust conditions in which both human and nonhuman agents operate. A 
nonideal approach to AI ethics would highlight how overlapping structures of institutional 
oppression situate robots as both agents and targets of power—as agents whose 
identity must be made available for inspection, public scrutiny, and abuse (Brscić, 
Kidokoro, Suehiro, & Kanda, 2015; Romero, 2018; Salvini et al., 2010; Smith & Zeller, 
2017). Human supremacist rhetoric reinforces these conditions, both drawing on and 
reinforcing the posture of other oppressive ideologies which control the social order 
through the classification and systematic privileging of agents by type. Advocating on 
behalf of robots as social participants deserving of minimal respect and dignity in virtue 
of that participation can encourage nothing but a more respectful, participatory, and 





Portions of this work were presented at the Gender, Bodies, and Technology 2019 
Conference in Blacksburg, VA, and the Computer Ethics—Philosophical Enquiry 2019 
in Norfolk, VA. Thanks to the support and wisdom of Anna Gollub, Patrick O’Donnell, 
Anna Lauren Hoffmann, Os Keyes, Ruha Benjamin, Eric Schwitzgebel, David Gunkel, 
Robin Zebrowski, Ashley Shew, Jonathan Flowers, Damien Williams, Joshua Earle, 
Justin Remhof, Dylan Wittkower, Brandon Stanford, Kelly Kitchens, Conner Downey, 
Austin Landini, Thomas Shea, Todd Kukla, Shawn and Mindy Dingle, the organizers 
and participants at GBT’19 and CEPE’19, and my wonderful students and colleagues at 







Agar, N. (2019). How to Treat Machines that Might Have Minds. Philosophy & 
Technology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-019-00357-8 
 
Ahuvia, A. C. (2005). Beyond the Extended Self: Loved Objects and Consumers’ 
Identity Narratives. Journal of Consumer Research, 32(1), 171–184. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/429607 
 
Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S., & Kirchner, L. (2016). Machine bias. ProPublica, May, 
23, 2016. 
 
Appiah, K. A. (2018). The lies that bind: Rethinking identity. Profile Books. 
 
Armstrong, P. (2002). The Postcolonial Animal. Society & Animals, 10(4), 413–419. 
https://doi.org/10.1163/156853002320936890 
 
Asaro, P. (2006). What should we want from a robot ethic. International Review of 
Information Ethics, 6(12), 9–16. 
 
Asaro, P. (2016). Hands up, don’t shoot!: HRI and the automation of police use of force. 
Journal of Human-Robot Interaction, 5(3), 55–69. 
 
Bardzell, J., & Bardzell, S. (2015). Humanistic Hci. Synthesis Lectures on Human-
Centered Informatics, 8(4), 1–185. 
 
Belcourt, B.-R. (2015). Animal bodies, colonial subjects:(Re) locating animality in 
decolonial thought. Societies, 5(1), 1–11. 
 
Benjamin, R. (2016). Catching Our Breath: Critical Race STS and the Carceral 
Imagination. Engaging Science, Technology, and Society, 2(0), 145–156. 
https://doi.org/10.17351/ests2016.70 
 
Benjamin, R. (2019). Race After Technology: Abolitionist Tools for the New Jim Code. 
Retrieved from https://books.google.com/books?id=G6-hDwAAQBAJ 
 
Boden, M., Bryson, J., Caldwell, D., Dautenhahn, K., Edwards, L., Kember, S., … 
Winfield, A. (2017). Principles of robotics: Regulating robots in the real world. 
Connection Science, 29(2), 124–129. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09540091.2016.1271400 
 
Braidotti, R. (1994). Nomadic subjects: Embodiment and sexual difference in 
contemporary feminist theory. Columbia University Press. 
 
Braidotti, R. (2002). Metamorphoses: Towards a materialist theory of becoming. 




Braidotti, R. (2013). The Posthuman. Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Braun, L. (2014). Breathing race into the machine: The surprising career of the 
spirometer from plantation to genetics. U of Minnesota Press. 
 
Brscić, D., Kidokoro, H., Suehiro, Y., & Kanda, T. (2015). Escaping from children’s 
abuse of social robots. Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Acm/Ieee International 
Conference on Human-Robot Interaction, 59–66. ACM. 
 
Bryson, J. (2009). Building persons is a choice. Erwägen Wissen Ethik, 20(2), 195–197. 
 
Bryson, J. (2010a). Robots should be slaves. Close Engagements with Artificial 
Companions: Key Social, Psychological, Ethical and Design Issues, 63–74. 
 
Bryson, J. (2010b). Why robot nannies probably won’t do much psychological damage. 
Interaction Studies, 11(2), 196–200. https://doi.org/10.1075/is.11.2.03bry 
 
Bryson, J. (2011). AI robots should not be considered moral agents. In N. Berlatsky 
(Ed.), Artificial Intelligence. Greenhaven Press. 
 
Bryson, J. (2015a). Artificial Intelligence and Pro-Social Behaviour. In C. Misselhorn 
(Ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems (pp. 
281–306). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15515-9_15 
 
Bryson, J. (2015b, August 4). Clones should NOT be slaves. Retrieved August 5, 2019, 
from Adventures in NI website: https://joanna-
bryson.blogspot.com/2015/10/clones-should-not-be-slaves.html 
 
Bryson, J. (2018a). AI & Global Governance: No One Should Trust AI. Centre for Policy 
Research at United Nations University. Retrieved from https://cpr.unu.edu/ai-
global-governance-no-one-should-trust-ai.html 
 
Bryson, J. (2018b). Patiency is not a virtue: The design of intelligent systems and 
systems of ethics. Ethics and Information Technology, 20(1), 15–26. 
 
Bryson, J. (2019, April 7). What we lost when we lost Google ATEAC. Retrieved August 
11, 2019, from Adventures in NI website: https://joanna-
bryson.blogspot.com/2019/04/what-we-lost-when-we-lost-google-ateac.html 
 
Bryson, J., Diamantis, M. E., & Grant, T. D. (2017). Of, for, and by the people: The legal 
lacuna of synthetic persons. Artificial Intelligence and Law, 25(3), 273–291. 
 
Bryson, J., & Kime, P. (1998). Just another artifact: Ethics and the empirical experience 




Buolamwini, J., & Gebru, T. (2018). Gender shades: Intersectional accuracy disparities 
in commercial gender classification. Conference on Fairness, Accountability and 
Transparency, 77–91. 
 
Chen, B. X., & Metz, C. (2019, May 22). Google’s Duplex Uses A.I. to Mimic Humans 




Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7–19. 
 
Coeckelbergh, M. (2015). The tragedy of the master: Automation, vulnerability, and 
distance. Ethics and Information Technology, 17(3), 219–229. 
 
Crist, E. (2017). The affliction of human supremacy. The Ecological Citizen, 1, 61–4. 
 
Danaher, J. (2019). Welcoming Robots into the Moral Circle: A Defence of Ethical 
Behaviourism. Science and Engineering Ethics, 1–27. 
 
Darling, K. (2016). Extending legal protection to social robots: The effects of 
anthropomorphism, empathy, and violent behavior towards robotic objects. In R. 
Calo, A. Froomkin, & I. Kerr, Robot Law (pp. 213–232). 
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781783476732.00017 
 
Deckha, M. (2012). Toward a postcolonial, posthumanist feminist theory: Centralizing 
race and culture in feminist work on nonhuman animals. Hypatia, 27(3), 527–
545. 
 
EFF Letter Opposing California Bot Disclosure Bill, SB 1001—First Amendment 




Ellis, E. C. (2015). Ecology in an anthropogenic biosphere. Ecological Monographs, 
85(3), 287–331. https://doi.org/10.1890/14-2274.1 
 
Estrada, D. (2018a). Value alignment, fair play, and the rights of service robots. 
Proceedings of the 2018 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, 102–
107. ACM. 
 




Eubanks, V. (2018). Automating inequality: How high-tech tools profile, police, and 




Floridi, L., Cowls, J., Beltrametti, M., Chatila, R., Chazerand, P., Dignum, V., … Vayena, 
E. (2018). AI4People—An Ethical Framework for a Good AI Society: 
Opportunities, Risks, Principles, and Recommendations. Minds and Machines. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-018-9482-5 
 
Fossa, F. (2018). Artificial moral agents: Moral mentors or sensible tools? Ethics and 
Information Technology, 20(2), 115–126. 
 
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and Punish. New York: Pantheon Books. 
 
Frank, L., & Nyholm, S. (2017). Robot sex and consent: Is consent to sex between a 
robot and a human conceivable, possible, and desirable? Artificial Intelligence 
and Law, 25(3), 305–323. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-017-9212-y 
 
Frye, M. (1983). Oppression. The politics of reality: Essays in feminist theory. Reprinted 
in V. Taylor, N. Whittier, and L. Rupp (Eds.) Feminist Frontiers. 
 
Gaard, G. (2011). Ecofeminism revisited: Rejecting essentialism and re-placing species 
in a material feminist environmentalism. Feminist Formations, 23(2), 26–53. 
 
Giraldo, I. (2016). Coloniality at work: Decolonial critique and the postfeminist regime. 
Feminist Theory, 17(2), 157–173. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464700116652835 
 
Gunkel, D. J. (2015). The rights of machines: Caring for robotic care-givers. In Machine 
Medical Ethics (pp. 151–166). Springer. 
 
Gunkel, D. J. (2018a). Robot rights. MIT Press. 
 
Gunkel, D. J. (2018b). The other question: Can and should robots have rights? Ethics 
and Information Technology, 20(2), 87–99. 
 
Haraway, D. (1989). Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern 
Science. New York: Routledge. 
 
Haraway, D. (1991). “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-
Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century,” in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The 
Reinvention of Nature. Routledge. 
 
Haraway, D. J. (2016). Staying with the trouble: Making kin in the Chthulucene. Duke 
University Press. 
 
Hayles, N. K. (2008). How we became posthuman: Virtual bodies in cybernetics, 




Hertzmann, A. (2019). Aesthetics of Neural Network Art. ArXiv Preprint 
ArXiv:1903.05696. 
 
Irani, L., Vertesi, J., Dourish, P., Philip, K., & Grinter, R. E. (2010). Postcolonial 
computing: A lens on design and development. Proceedings of the SIGCHI 
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 1311–1320. ACM. 
 
Jenkins, R. (2014). Social identity. Routledge. 
 
Johnson, B. (2019, April 6). Hey Google, sorry you lost your ethics council, so we made 




Jones, R. (2015). Personhood and Social Robotics: A psychological consideration. 
Routledge. 
 
Kaplan, D. M. (2009). Readings in the Philosophy of Technology. Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers. 
 
Katz, E. (2000). Against the inevitability of anthropocentrism. Beneath the Surface: 
Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology, 17–42. 
 
Kera, D., Block, A., & Link, L. (2009). Digital memorials & design for apocalypse: 
Towards a non-anthropocentric design. Communications and New Media 
Programme National University of Singapore Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences. 
 
Keyes, O., Hoy, J., & Drouhard, M. (2019). Human-Computer Insurrection: Notes on an 
Anarchist HCI. Proceedings of the 2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems, 339. ACM. 
 
Khader, S. J. (2018). Decolonizing Universalism: A Transnational Feminist Ethic. 
Studies in Feminist Philosophy. 
 
Konopka, A. (2013). Public, Ecological and Normative Goods: The Case of Deepwater 
Horizon. Ethics, Policy & Environment, 16(2), 188–207. 
 
Koops, B.-J. (2006). Should ICT Regulation Be Technology-Neutral? (SSRN Scholarly 
Paper No. ID 918746). Retrieved from Social Science Research Network 
website: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=918746 
 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by: University of Chicago press. 
Chicago, IL. 
 
Latonero, M. (2018). Governing Artificial Intelligence: Upholding Human Rights and 






Latour, B. (2003). Do you believe in reality? News from the trenches of the science 
wars. Philosophy of Technology: The Technological Condition, Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd, 126–137. 
 
Lawhead, J. (2015). Structural Modeling Error and the System Individuation Problem 
[Preprint]. Retrieved August 12, 2019, from http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11971/ 
 
Leopold, A., 1886-1948. (1949). A Sand County almanac, and Sketches here and there. 
Retrieved from https://search.library.wisc.edu/catalog/9910065222502121 
 
Lewis, S. L., & Maslin, M. A. (2015). Defining the Anthropocene. Nature, 519(7542), 
171–180. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature14258 
 
Lupinacci, J. (2015). Recognizing Human-Supremacy. Anarchism and Animal 
Liberation: Essays on Complementary Elements of Total Liberation, 179. 
 
Metzinger, T. (2019, August 24). Ethics washing made in Europe. Retrieved July 31, 
2019, from Der Tagesspiegel website: https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/eu -
guidelines-ethics-washing-made-in-europe/24195496.html 
 
Midgley, M. (2003). Utopias, Dolphins and Computers: Problems in Philosophical 
Plumbing. Routledge. 
 
Mills, C. W. (2005). “Ideal Theory” as Ideology. Hypatia, 20(3), 165–184. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/hyp.2005.0107 
 
Mills, C. W. (2011, April 4). The Political Economy of Personhood « On the Human. 




Musiał, M. (2017). Designing (artificial) people to serve – the other side of the coin. 
Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 29(5), 1087–1097. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0952813X.2017.1309691 
 
Neely, E. L. (2014). Machines and the moral community. Philosophy & Technology, 
27(1), 97–111. 
 
Noble, S. U. (2018). Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines Reinforce Racism. 
NYU Press. 
 
Nocella, A. (2012). Challenging whiteness in the animal advocacy movement. Journal 




Nocella, A., White, R. J., & Cudworth, E. (2015). Anarchism and animal liberation: 
Essays on complementary elements of total liberation. McFarland. 
 
Nussbaum, M. C. (1998). Cultivating humanity. Harvard University Press. 
 
Nussbaum, M. C. (2010). Not for profit: Why democracy needs the humanities (Vol. 2). 
Princeton University Press Princeton, NJ. 
 
Oliveira, H. G. (2017). O Poeta Artificial 2.0: Increasing meaningfulness in a poetry 
generation twitter bot. Proceedings of the Workshop on Computational Creativity 
in Natural Language Generation (CC-NLG 2017), 11–20. 
 
Petersen, S. (2007). The ethics of robot servitude. Journal of Experimental & 
Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 19(1), 43–54. 
 
Petersen, S. (2012). Designing People to Serve. In P. Lin, G. Bekey, & K. Abney (Eds.), 
Robot  Ethics.  The  Ethical and  Social  Implications  of  Robotics (pp. 283–298). 
Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press. 
 
Prescott, T. J. (2017). Robots are not just tools. Connection Science, 29(2), 142–149. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09540091.2017.1279125 
 
Rainey, S. (2016). Friends, robots, citizens? ACM SIGCAS Computers and Society, 
45(3), 225–233. https://doi.org/10.1145/2874239.2874271 
 
Reardon, J. (2009). Race to the Finish: Identity and Governance in an Age of 
Genomics. Princeton University Press. 
 
Reed, C. (2007). Taking sides on technology neutrality. SCRIPTed, 4, 263. 
 
Risse, M. (2018, December). Human Rights and Artificial Intelligence: The Long 
(Worrisome?) View. Presented at the Human Rights, Ethics, and Artificial 
Intelligence: Challenges for the next 70 Years of the Universal Declaration, The 
Carr Center for Human Rights Policy. Retrieved from 
https://youtu.be/YniwuPWhHSo 
 
Roden, D. (2014). Posthuman life: Philosophy at the edge of the human. Routledge. 
 
Romero, S. (2018, December 31). Wielding Rocks and Knives, Arizonans Attack Self -




Said, C. (2019, May 26). Kiwibots win fans at UC Berkeley as they deliver fast food at 






Said, E. W. (2004). Humanism and democratic criticism. Columbia University Press. 
 
Salvini, P., Ciaravella, G., Yu, W., Ferri, G., Manzi, A., Mazzolai, B., … Dario, P. (2010, 
October 15). How safe are service robots in urban environments? Bullying a 
robot. 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1109/ROMAN.2010.5654677 
 
Schwitzgebel, E., & Garza, M. (2015). A defense of the rights of artificial intelligences. 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 39(1), 89–119. 
 
Smith, D. H., & Zeller, F. (2017). The Death and Lives of hitchBOT: The Design and 
Implementation of a Hitchhiking Robot. Leonardo, 50(1), 77–78. 
 
Spiel, K., Keyes, O., & Barlas, P. (2019). Patching Gender: Non-binary Utopias in HCI. 
Extended Abstracts of the 2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems  - CHI EA ’19, 1–11. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/3290607.3310425 
 
Steiner, G. (2010). Anthropocentrism and its discontents: The moral status of animals in 
the history of western philosophy. University of Pittsburgh Pre. 
 
Stieglitz, S., Brachten, F., Ross, B., & Jung, A.-K. (2017). Do Social Bots Dream of 
Electric Sheep? A Categorisation of Social Media Bot Accounts. 11. 
 
Street, S. (2006). A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value. Philosophical 
Studies, 127(1), 109–166. 
 
Suárez-Serrato, P., Velázquez Richards, E. I., & Yazdani, M. (2018). Socialbots 
Supporting Human Rights. Proceedings of the 2018 AAAI/ACM Conference on 
AI, Ethics, and Society  - AIES ’18, 290–296. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/3278721.3278734 
 
Thomas, V., Remy, C., & Bates, O. (2017). The Limits of HCD: Reimagining the 
Anthropocentricity of ISO 9241-210. Proceedings of the 2017 Workshop on 
Computing Within Limits, 85–92. https://doi.org/10.1145/3080556.3080561 
 
Turing, A. (1947). Lecture to the London Mathematical Society. In B. Carpenter & R. 
Doran (Eds.), A. M. Turing’s ACE Report of 1946 and Other Papers. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
 
Valentin, G. (2014). From HCI to ACI: User-centered and Participatory design in Canine 




van Wynsberghe, A., & Robbins, S. (2019). Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial 
Moral Agents. Science and Engineering Ethics, 25(3), 719–735. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-018-0030-8 
 
Verbeek, P.-P. (2005). What things do: Philosophical reflections on technology, agency, 
and design. Penn State Press. 
 
Verbeek, P.-P. (2011). Moralizing technology: Understanding and designing the morality 
of things. University of Chicago Press. 
 
Vincent, J. (2017, October 30). Pretending to give a robot citizenship helps no one. 




Vinge, V. (1993). The coming technological singularity: How to survive in the post-
human era. Science Fiction Criticism: An Anthology of Essential Writings, 352–
363. 
 
Von Ahn, L., Blum, M., Hopper, N. J., & Langford, J. (2003). CAPTCHA: Using hard AI 
problems for security. International Conference on the Theory and Applications of 
Cryptographic Techniques, 294–311. Springer. 
 
Whittaker, M., Crawford, K., Dobbe, R., Fried, G., Kaziunas, E., Mathur, V., … 
Schwartz, O. (2018). AI now report 2018. AI Now Institute at New York 
University. 
 
Wilde, O. (1891). The Soul of Man Under Socialism. Fortnightly, 49(340), 292–319. 
 
Williams, D. (2019a). Consciousness and Conscious Machines: What’s At Stake? AAAI 
Spring Symposium: Towards Conscious AI Systems. Presented at the Stanford 
CA. Retrieved from http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2287/paper5.pdf 
 
Williams, D. (2019b). Heavenly Bodies: Why It Matters That Cyborgs Have Always 
Been About Disability, Mental Health, and Marginalization. Mental Health, and 
Marginalization (June 8, 2019). 
 
Winner, L. (1980). Do artifacts have politics? Daedalus, 121–136. 
 
Wise, T. (2005, August 13). Animal Whites: PETA and the Politics of Putting Things in 




Young, I. M. (1988). Five Faces of Oppression. Philosophical Forum, 19, 270–290. 
Wiley. 
26 
 
 
 
 
